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"SOCIALIST MORALITY" IN SARTRE'S
UNPUBLISIlED 1964 ROME LECTURE:
A SUMMARY AND COMMENTARy1
The tint prineiple of play i. man himaclf; throulh it he escape. hi. natural nature;
he himself setl the value and the nalel for hil letalnd eonsentl to play only leeording
to the ndel whieh he himself hai eatabliahed Ind defined.... Thil partieular type
of projeet, whieh hai frecdom for ita foundation Ind ita goal, deICrYel a special
study. . . . But such a Itudy cannot be made herc; it beloßlI ralher 10 In Elhics. . .
-Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943)2
If we grant that capitalism aod bureaucratic socialism are so anti-human
as to require all humans to seek their overthrow as a matter of moral priority,
in favor of some more human future, then how can this task be accomplished
in an effective and morally defensible manner? ODe reason socialists have been
unable to attract more persons to their cause may be because of their poor
answers, or lack of answers, to this question. Jean-Paul Sartre, in an
unpublished lecture of 1964 for a conference on "Morality and Society," offered
elements of a novel response. On May 23 of that year, invited by Rome's
Gramsci Institute-the research center of the (then-named) Communist Party of
ltaly-Sartre addressed a group of left intellectuals from Europe and North
America on "socialist morality." Having discussed the origins and structure of
IThia artiele il based on I paper given at the Sartre Society, September 28, 1991. We tbant
Arlette el-Kaim Sartre ror aulhorizing quotations and Philip Knee, JUltin Schwartz and Joseph Walsh
for helpful eomments. Robert V. Stone tbantl the C.W. Post Research Committee for support.
2Being and Nolhingness: An Essay In Phenonlenologlcal On'ology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New
York: Philosophieal Library, 1956), p. 581 (bereafter "Bfr).
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tbis morality in earlier cbapters of 7he 1964 Rome Leelure• Sartre discusses its
hearing on socialist revolution in tbe final cbapter. entitled "Moratity of Praxis
and Alienated Moralities. " This unpublished. rougbly written. and incomplete
work is available for study at Paris' Bibliotb~ueNationale. In the course of its
four cbapters and 139 typescript pages. it applies Sartre's progressive-regressive
metbod to moral phenomena. 100ugh we have discussed the first three cbapters
elsewhere we will briefly review them below.3 In Chapter Four, Sartre arrives
at the moment of "progressive synthesis" in which he attempts "to grasp the
moral problem as it is manifested to [tbe historico-ethical agent] through bis
historical task and in the present conjunclure. ,,4 We cannot fully analyze this
chapter here in its proper context of Sartre's criticisms of capitalism and
bureaucratic socialism. We will introduce its basic concepts. summarize its
contents, and briefly situate it in Sartre's oeuvre-suggesting its role in fulfilling
his 1943 projection of an ethics-and finally. we will raise what we take to be
pertinent questions for its evaluation.
Since for Sartre the dominant systems under which we live exploit and
oppress humans, what he calls "the ethical problem" is to leam how a
revolutionary "counter-system" can attain its goal of "humanity" while in the
process surviving within those systems. Surviving will involve giving birth to
"limited." even "alienated." moralities at various stages of struggle. But how.
then. can the revolutionary force avoid degenerating into repeating the capitalist
or bureaucratic socialist systems themselves? Such degeneration would
3See our "Dialectical Ethics: A First Look at Sartre's Unpublished 1964 Rome uClure HOles,"
Social Texl No. 13-14, Winter/Spring 1986, pp. 195-215; and allO our "'Making the Human' in
Sartre's Unpublished Dialectical Ethics" in Writing the Polilics 01 Dlfference, ed. H. Silverman
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 111-122. Eyewitnesses say Sartre
eonsulted the entire large bundle of pages he brought to the podium-often tuming many pages at
onee. News accounts confinn he touched on eentral points from eaeh of The 1964 Rome Leclure's
four ehapters. These notes may have been drafted with a view to the lecture series he already
planned to give in the U.S. at Comell University the following year. Thil series was not given due
to Sartre's protest of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam in Febroary, 1965, though he drafted lectures
speeifieally for Comell (which complement 7Jae 1964 Rome Leclure). See our ·Sartre's Morality and
Hislory: A First Look at the Notes for the Unpublished 1965 Comell Lcctures, " in Saf1re Alive, ed.
Ronald Aronson and Adrian van den Hoven (Detroit: Wayne State Univenity Press, 1991).
4rhis phrase comes from Sartre 's overview of the mid-1960's project at the start of MoraLity and
Hislory.
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indefinitely postpone "humanity," making the lalter a "pure ideal, pure
regulative concept" instead of an ongoing unifier of struggle. "Socialist
morality" (he also speaks of "revolutionary morality") is therefore characterized
by a certain "contradiction," whicb it does not resolve. On the one band, it is
the only morality determining itself in relation to the goal of "integral
humanity." On the otber, it knowingly produces alienated moralities within itself
in order to meet the needs of present struggle. Thus
The problem ia therefore lo leam how to produce that dialectical movement which,
while poailing auch alienated moraliliel, can allO contelt their limill in relation to the
very end which they aeek lo auain. (147/122)
Sartre's solution to "the ethical problem" is, in a word, "morality." This
designates in Chapter Four a practice of reflection and self-eriticism within the
"revolutionary organization." A "socialist morality" that generales and controls
alienated moralities in the course of struggle is possible because the future goal
of "historical praxis" generally-"bumanity"-provides a present "role of
efficacity." "Morality" for the revolutionary group, then, becomes in part the
activity of ordering means in light of ends:
Moralily il conlrol of praxii in light of itaelf, that il, of itl end.
Rute of efficacily: all meanaare .000 for auainin.the end, on the condition
thal they do not alter il in producing it. Morality il a lupplementary conlrol of
efficacily: the end beingthe Iynthetic enaemble of meana, aocialilt moralily il none
olher than the end illelf reluming upon the meanl to conlrol them in lighl of itaelf,
thal ia, in order lo demand of the meanathal they ahould be ablOlute means, meaning
thal they are al once meana 10 meana (hence linked mediately lo the end) and meana
10 the end, Iinked direcdy 10 the end. [Such meanaare linked direclly lO the end by]
al once respeeling Ihe final demand and producing humanily in the negalive fonn of
aub-humanily negaling ita aub-humanily. (163/138)
This is the center of the "socialist morality" sketched in Chapter Four. But to
grasp Sartre's proposal here we must step back and introduce Sartre's terms, in
particular: what "humanity" as end entails; howhistorical "praxis" as means
posits humanity as its end; the "sub-human" condition of tbe starting point; and,
the danger of "alienation" facing the "revolutionary organization." We'll clarify
these terms in the context of the mid-60's writings on ethics.
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1. Introduction
The morality of revolutionary action arises for Sartre not from norms
whose validity can be established independently of history, but from the iooer
structure ofhistorical action itself. Sartre has described "praxis"-human action
in its historical context-in his Criti1ue 0/ Dialeetical Reason Volume I.
published in 1960, four years earlier. That work argued that praxis has a
means-end structure. Along with other components of history, this structure
evinces a dialectical rationality that allows history itself-understood as
developing "totalization" ofpraxeis-to be at least "comprehended" and perhaps
consciously made.6 As we will see, 7he 1964 Rome Leeture builds directly on
both volumes of the Critique,' advancing on them by bringing out the
normative aspects of praxis. The paradigm case of praxis is productive work
aimed at sustaining Iife. As the title of ehapter Four implies, there is a
"morality of praxis." We will examine this morality in the context supplied by
the three earlier chapters of 7he 1964 Rome Leeture. These were in turn
developed on the bases of CDR 1 and 11. The spring or motive for historical
action, Sartre repeats in 1964, is in need. The end or goal posited in need,
however, is what he calls "humanity" (or, also, "autonomy"). The dialectical
"birth" of "humanity" is a minor event as described in CDR. It occupies center
stage in 7he 1964 Rome Leeture.
1-ypically, Sartre gave a glimpse of hil ethical thinking in a fooloote ahowing that in 1960 he
already had clearly in mind rnany central theme. he wal beginning to elaborate in 1964-65. Crltique
0/ Dialeclical Reason: Volume I, 7heory 0/ Praclical Ensembles, tranl. Alan Sheridan-Smith, cd.
Jonathan Ree (London: New Left Bookl, 1976), p. 247n. (Hereafter: "CDR 1..)
6Analysis of action wilhin history is, Sartre notes, inherently likely to yield "the instrument of
thought by means of which Hiltory thinks it8elf insofar as tbey (tbe instruments by which Hiltory
thinks itselfl Are also the practical instruments by means of which it i. made.· (CDR I, p. 40.)
7Sal1re may have had much of Volume 11 done when he published CDR I in 1960. He brießy
resumed wort on Volume 11 in 1962, though the incomplete results were published only
posthumoullyas Critique de la raison dialeclique, Tome 11 (inacheve): L 'inlelligibilile de I 'H;slo;re,
ed. Arlette Elkaim-Sal1re (paris: Gallimard, 1985); English translation by Quintin Hoare, Critique
o/Dialectical Reason, Volume /1 {U'lfinished}: 7he InlelligibUity o/H;slory (London: Verso, 1991).
This translation i. hereafter referred to a. ·CDR 11.·
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"Humanity" is a rich concept designating a multi-faceted entity.
Humanity's root is in need. Need is not reducible to preference (as liberal
economic theory would have it); ralber it posits a future satisfaction, and,
thereby, continued Iife. A normative demand is already present, according to
Sartre, who writes (believing he is quoting Man, though we cannot fmd it in
Marx): "[need] carries within it its own reason for satisfaction." (97/77)8 The
norm here, though teleological, is not utilitarian. The satisfaction aimed-at is not
for Sartre a mere benefit to a humanity that is presumed to be already complete.
What is posited by need is rather "integral humanity" itself. How is this to be
attained or got at1 Such humanity, which is presently lacking (through some
particular lack), does not come to "practical organisms" from without. The
practieal organism's own capacity for productive action (if only that of picking
a froit from a tree) is given, along with need itself, as the means of closing the
gap opened by the need between present lack and future satisfaction. The
practical organism's goal is thus "temporalized" by need in the form of the
historical project of filling its lacks through its own action. It thereby aims
literally to make itself. Need points, then, not just to satisfaction or restored
wholeness but to "humanity" qua hußWls who are "their own product," hence,
to wholeness restored by the action of the needy beings themselves.
The normative element in praxis-the "reason" for its satisfaction which
need "carries with" itself-becomes evident when we focus on the prospective,
future-oriented character of need. Initially praxis confronts a field from which
what is needed is lacking; humanity does not yet exist. The oddity of human
action is that in it an unknown future, not the past, precedes and conditions the
present. In need the present is transcended in favor of a non-existent, possible,
future satisfaction. All lacks and obstacles stem from this upsurge of the
practical organism's original need: ifthere's no need, then there's no lacked
object or obstacle 10 getting it. Similarly with all diversions, alienations, and
failures of praxis: if there's no goal-oriented free project of transcending the
present, then there's no diversion, alienation, or faHure of that project. But there
can't be such an understanding or praxis unless it sometimes does and in
principle can achieve its goal. Since need is an experience only of praetical
organisms, the field containing lacks and obstacles can always in principle be
Intese numbers refer lolhe manuscripl and typescript pages, respeelively, of the unpublished,
untillcd tcxt whieh wc eall 1Jae 1964 Rome uc'ure.
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transformed. Freed.om-which is presumed in any reorganization of the given
field in light of a non-existent future-thereby underlies and makes possible all
failure and unintended results. This field can be made into a source of means for
filling the lack and overcoming obstacles, since lacks and obstacles can only be
discovered as such by a heing that bas first posited both a possible future
humanityand its own power to attain it. This means may in fact be lacking. And
even after obstacles are transformed into tools the whole endeavor may faH. Dut
tben we can say that humanity is present in and subtends its own failure. Need
thus posits no impossible tasks, thougb along the way, the task may he diverted
into producing the opposite of wbat was intended.
Sartre caUs tbis power of transformation "invention. " It is the capacity of
practical organisms to use everything, including themselves, as means to the end
of autonomous bumanity. In Morality and History Sartre characterizes invention
as "the moment of morality in historical praxis." Yet we find it is only
morality's "optimistic" side (our word) that enters the dialectic here. Morality's
historicaUy invariant "form," Sartre says (without endorsing aU the Kantian
overtones) is 'the sheer "unconditional possibility" of doing whatever act is
morally required (though again, such acts may fail). Morality's "content"-the
conduct required by tbis or that actual morality-changes historically. What is
constant and typical of morality is therefore invention, that aspect of praxis
activated inthe actual undertaking and unfolding of the morally required acl.
Specifically moral action reminds us that ordinary historical action, with its
moral moment, is conditioned but not determined by the past or the present. Due
to invention, humanity as the goal of historical praxis is "unconditionally
possible." In sum:
... the root of morality is in need, that is to say, in the animality of man. It is need
which poses man as his own end, and praxis as domination of the universc by man
10 be effecled Ihrough worlc. (100/79'"
Humanity, inasmuch as it is lacked, and inasmuch as its inventive praxis is the <
basis for any other lack, and hence any value whatever, may be valued and
80ught in its own right. This is true even if human reality is presently
Clrbe sexism of Sartrets use of "man" herc to refer to both sexes is moderated by the fact that
in general he uscs "man" and the non-sexist tenn "humans" interchangeably in this reganl.
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"alienated." Our capacity to autonomously be our own product is indirectly
aimed at inasmuch as praxis is presently devoted first 10 maintaining, say, a
system of profit or bureaucracy. Humanity-this capacity for autonomous self-
production-is devoted first to repetitive reproduction of such systems. It is
diverted from its proper goal, itself, to the extent humanity is sought as a mere
by-product of such reproduction. This misdirection of a capacity doesn't entail
loss of humanity as a goal, however, just its pursuit in alienated form. Even
though historical praxis has in fact always been blocked and diverted from tbis
goal, humanity, wbich has sustained this alienation, can aim at itself. Thus
humanity can be made the direet novel aim of heretofore historically alienated
praxis.
.- Others qua opposing classes, etc. are pitted against Others (including
ourselves as "Others") in a milieu of scarcity, in existing conditions of praxis,
according to Sartre. This circumstance has fragmented our history intothe plural
and hierarchicized histories of classes, races, genders, and nations. In such a
"serialized" milieu our attainment of humanity will be blocked. Our results will
always be diverted from and unrecognizable to our intentions, with the
consequent want of "autonomy. "This is an essential feature ofhumanity, whose
keynote is consciousness of heing the authors of OUf acts and their results.
Autonomous humanity is for Sartre-as for Aristotle-impossible in isolation
from others. Rather it requires group praxis. Humanity is not a glorious, lost
past to be recovered. We can see that humanity as sustained global group praxis
can be a future goal of praxis without ever having occurred morethan
sporadically and locally in the past. IO Thus humanity must be invented without
IOSpeeificaUy, "humanity" initially ariles in the praxii of what in CDR I Sartre had called "the
pledged group." This il the dialeetieal scquel to the "group-in-fusion." When the fusing group
sueeeeds-at least inasmueh as the external threat that had unified it from without is temporarily
miuing-it must hold itaelf together by ilSelj' againlt the centripelal inßuence of scarcity on ita
members. The pledged group is the eooled-down group-in-fusion, poiaed between lhe danger of
regressing into seriality or progres.ing with ita lask of aocial change. The pledged group is, he aays,
"lhe origin of humanity ." Sal1re's quasi-teehnieal UIC of the tenn "humanity" originates at this point.
The group's "interior objeetivity" is "materially objeetified" in, e.g., a written paet. This expresscs
not Ihe group'. "being" but rather "the etemll, froun preaervltioß of ita ri3ing" IS 1 group. "We
are all brothera" (sie) ean bc aaid by the pledged group'. membcn, Sll1rc claims, not beeausc they
share. eommon "nature" that the pledge externalizes (for lhat would lieense ulto speak of pea. in
a pod as "brothers"), but ralher "in so far a., following the ereative let of the plcdge, we are our
own sons, our eommon ereation." Autonomy .a group aelf-produetion is thereby tcmporarily
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models. Under such. conditions ofclass struggle amidst scarcity-which are those
of history to date-praxis first aims at reproducing a system instead of producing
humanity. Instead of being its own product, humanity is an alienated by-product
of a system.
Another way of characterizing the present alienation of praxis is to say that
to date the "practico-inert"-the domain of worked matter inherited from the
past that conditions all present conduct and thereby diverts it from its aim-has
dominated praxis. 11 The practico-inert presently guides praxis rather than the
reverse. Yet this very fact shows us that it need not guide praxis, the practico-
inert being itself a product of praxis. Morality cannot be neutral here. Historical
moralities are themselves for Sartre ·practico-inert.· This is the "pessimistic"
side of morality, as it were. Moralities reside in things, especially tools of all
kinds, for Sartre. There are dormant commands in ·worked matter" of all sorts
tbat are activated when we re-use it. The domain of worked matter enshrines
past actions and class interests in imperatives, values, etc, that weigh on and
divert present action away from making the human. 12 Instead of heing the
product of this giant past product, humans can he their own product; they can
dominate, instead of being dominated by, the practico-inert (including
rnoralities). Given the structure of historical praxis, then, the object of
need-and hence the goal human history could have (should we choose to give
it one)-is no lessthan "autonomous humanity." This goal is ourselves,
attained. Oaths such as the Tennis Coult Oath of 1789 (and perhaps, we would add, the Declaration
of Independence of 1776) codify the voluntary introduction of terror into the revolutionary group.
"Humanity" thus seems to entail the mutual power that insurgent group members asselt over each
other, at least so long as scarcity endures, a phenomenon Saltre caU. "fratemity-terror." (CDR I,
p. 436-437). See also Sartre's analysis in CDR 11 ofthe Boisheviks as a pledged group (CDR ;;, pp.
152-153). Though it arises in a milieu of scarcity, the humanity of the pledged group cannot be
sus,a;ned in such a milieu. To avoid sinking back into seriality requires (at least) solving the
problem of production and introducing abundance, which Saltre considers possible.
llCDR I, pp. 67, 71, 318-320.
I1nough this point is fully developed only in the writings of the mid-1960's on ethics, it is
already present in CDR I, p. 249n. As Saltre makel clear in his work on Flaubelt, "worked matter"
can also consist of ideas in literary texts, such that Flaubelt's possibilitiel as a writer Are limited and
his projects Are divelted by the literary tools he inherited from his literary forebears. L 'Idiot de la
familie: Gus,ave Flauberl de 1821 d 1857 (Vol. 111) (paris: Gallimard, 1972.)
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understood as the future global grouping of beings producing ourselves through
meeting our needs by joint praxis upon the material world. 13
While such "humanity" (and "autonomy") is not yet "the future of
humans" it could be, that is, it is an underlying and irrepressible possibility of
our actual history. Humanity is precisely what would be possible if, instead of
doggedly reproducing a system (be it of profit or bureaucratic hierarchy), we
produced ourselves as human. Our present state of reproducing such systems,
in the hope that doing so will make our humanity for os, Sartre designates as
tbat ofthe "sous-homme," the "sub-man," which we will also render, with some
discomfort, as "sub-humanity." The ongoing "praxis-process" (a process
sustained by praxis)14 of capitalism and bureaucratic socialism, leaves some
"favored" and others "unfavored"-Ianguage Sartre evidently prefers in The
1964 Rome Leeture to the language of classes. The favored in general are
oppressors and the unfavored are the oppressed. The unfavored are compelled
to reproduce the system by their raw need; the favored are compelled to
reproduce it by their Winterest," Le. ,their dependence for their life on wthe thing"
(system-produced profit, privilege, etc.)IS Both the favored and the unfavored
l~e concept of ".utonomy" in The 1964 Rome Lec'ure il closely rel.ted to the concept of
"lOvereignty" advanced by Sartre earlier in CDR I: "8y sovereignty, in efTect, 1 mean the absolute
practical power of the dialectical organilm, that il 10 ..y, purely and limply ila praxii al a
developing syntheaia of .ny given multiplicity in ita practical field, whether inanimate objeela, living
things or men. This rearraßlement-inaofar al it i. perfonned by the organie individual-i. the
atarting-point and milieu of aU action (whether IUcceuful or unlUcceuful). 1 ean it IOvereignty
becausc il ia aimply freedom itaelf a. a project which tranacenda and unifiel the material
circumstances which gave rise to it and becaulC the only way to deprive anyone of it ia 10 destroy
the organism itself." (CDR I, p. S78). The alienation of lUch individualsovereignty in the personal
power of Stalin-efTected, paradoxicaUy, in the very name of the power of the people-il traced in
CDR n, wriUen aboul two yean before The 1964 Rome LeclUre. (Cf. esp. CDR 11, p. 122-123). See
also Ronald Aronson·s discuSlion of IOvereignty in Sarlre's Second Crillque (Chicago: University
ofChicago Presl, 1981), pp. 116-119. Autonomy, by comparilOn, Sartre makel clear in The 1964
Rome Lec'ure. il not a feature of individual action .ince .uch action. under conditions of seriality.
can uuerly alienale its sovereignty. Rather, autonomy can be a feature of group praxis sincc it alone
has lhe possibility of controlling unintended practical conscquences ("counter-finalilies").
14CDR I, pp. SS I-SS4.
ISCDR I. pp. 197-219.
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are products of the.system, both are tied in conflicting ways to the same false
hope that reproducing the system will make them human, and both embed
themselves ever deeper in their sub-humanity by faHing to attempt to "make the
human" against the system. The only end possible for such "sub-humans" is
"humanity, " that is, the permanent termination of their sub-humanity.
Humanity is the end-unknowable, but .ralpable al orientation-for a being that
definel itself by praxis, that is, for the incomplete and alienated humans that we are.
(1351112)
"Humanity," then, entails: satisfaction of needs instead of scarcity; self-
production. instead of alienation; novelty instead of repetition; group instead of
serial action; and praxis guiding, instead of heing guided by, the practico-inert.
Humanity is an objective possibility. This is to say it can be the goal of sub-
humans; it is an option, not a necessary outcome or even a probability. lOus
humanity is already impiicit in historical praxis insofar as the latter is laken up
by existing systems as a mere means to their reproduction. It demands to be its
own direct goal, since as an end it is lacking, it is not; it is needed. This, then,
is a hasty overview of the context ioto which Sartre introduces his "socialist
moraiity" with its "role of efficacity."
2. Summary
How is socialist morality to help in attaining humanity? Concretely, how
is humanity as the end of historical praxis to "control" the "alienated moralities"
to which it gives birth as a means to itself? ehapter Four is devoted to
answering this question.
For Sartre, humanity or autonomy, if it is not a mere ideal but an
historical project, requires as a condition the classless world of communism in
its profound sense. If parents are to cease giving birth to sub-humans, birth itself
must be "humanized." This requires that practical agents first make a society
where no economic stroctures produce humans, and no state or alienated
morality inhibits "pure common decisions." (141/117) Production of its own
collective life by needy humanity implies a "solidarity" in which "the entire
human group, stroggling agaiost the division of labor, renders to integral
humanity the entire product of its work." (143/118) For such global self-
production, common ownership of the means of production is required.
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Otherwise everyone's labor, including those who do own the means of
production, aims at profit, bureaucracy or some other end alien to the producers
themselves. Communism, understood as such common ownership of the means
of production, is the undiverted end implicit in human need. In the second
volume of bis Critique 0/ Dialeet;cal Reason, Sartre had examined how the
project of attaining this end, because it bad been undertaken in the pre-eapitalist
conditions of the former USSR while encircled by hostile capitalist powers, had
been diverted into realizing its opposite in the form of Stalinism.16 Under
these conditions the socialist impulse itself brought about its own hellish
derailment. But in 1964 Sartre is focussed on that original socialist project itself.
This project, he insists, does not aim at a system. Its objective is instead
"beyond all systems." (106/84) Socialism is rooted in need and aims at
humanity.
Socialism a. Ihe general movement whoae objective i. Ihe ereation of eommuni.t
society i. Ihereforc the real movement of the opprcucd mailei ißlOfar a. thele arc
defined, in Iheir daily Iife, by Ihe absolute demand Ihat humana be their own produet.
(146/120)
Socialism is not an end in itself but a movement, a means to the end of integral
humanity. Communism is one feature of the end sought: humans who do not
control the means of production cannot be their own product. 17 But
communism, socialism, and all other movements are themselves mere means to
(and components of)the goal, Le. of humanity.
To make the human, starting from within existing systems that suppress
it, requires "organization and institutions. " (145/119) The goals of the socialist
movement cannot be immediately attained through the spread of good feeling or
16Cf. espe CDR 11, p. 115-117.
17Sartrc two yeara earlier had morc amply deacribed aocialism-undentood as Ihe means to
eommunism-as folIows: "For whal eharaeterizc. it fundamentally is neilherabundanee, nortbe total
elimination of classc., nor working-cla.. IOverci,nty-even Ihough Ihese eharacteri.tiel are
indispensable, at least al distant aima of tbe elaential transfonnation. It il tbe elimination of
exploitation and of oppres.ion, or-in positive tenns-tbe eolleetive appropriation of Ihe means of
produetion." (CDR 11, p. 115-116) Commcnlina on tbi. pa_ge, William L. McBride notes
pertinently how traditionaland uncontroveraial Sartrc'. eharaeterization of socialism is here. See his
Sanre's Political 7heory (Bloomington: Indiana Univeraity Prell, 1991), p. 163.
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through spontaneous moral conversions ad serialim. 18 This is because
historical praxis, aimed at autonomous, integral humanity, discovers itself
inilially as blocked by persons with interests who benefit from the system and
stand between one's need and its satisfaction. To unblock praxis so that humans
may indeed be their own product therefore requires of sub-humans a "pure" or
"revolutionary" praxis aimed at classless society. Such higher-order praxis is
addressed not only to meeting needs within the system but to altering the system
itself. This requires construction of what Sartre calls a ·counter-system· inthe
midst of the system. Since it is unlikely, in particular, that the owners of
productive machines will voluntarily hand them over to producers, "rigorous
organizations" are needed in order to wrest them away from their present
owners for service to integral humanity.19
Their needs unmet, oppressed and exploited persons will initially lash out
"against all moralities." In fact though, Sartre contends, they reject the system
in the name of a "fundamental moral demand which is at one with the
organism's material demand to live. " And tbis demand is precisely "morality as
unconditional and radical future." (144/119)20 But if "morality" in such a
18Prior to developing his theory ofgroups, Sartre had both entertained and cast doubt on the idea
of revolution through mass converaion ad serlalim in his Cahiers pour une morale of 1947 (paris:
Gallimard, 1983), p. 95.
19Nine year8 later, in 1975 Sartre envisioned thil aocialilt revolution al a concrete, long-tenn,
but not permanent lasle: ". can only say that at least fifty years of stNggle will be necessary for the
partial victory of the people's power over bourgeois power. There will be advances and retreats,
limited successes and reversible defeats, in order finally to bring into existence a new society in
which all the powers have been done away with because each individual has tull possession of
himself. Revolution is not a single moment in which one power overthrows another; it is a. long
movement in which power is dismantled." "Self-Portrait at Seventy," in UJe/Silualions: Essays
Wrillen and Spoun, trans. Paul Auster and Lydia Davis (New York: Pantheon, 1977), p. 84.
20In the mid-1960's Sartre evidently believed that ..tisfaction of workers' needs was impossible
in the stNcture of the status quo, and thus the demand to satisfy them would inevitably tend to
disintegrate the Slalus quo. In 1972, though, it seems Sartre modified this view. He granted that
"capitalism satisfies certain primary needs" and even that an artificially created need (his example
ia the need for a car) can be "an instNment of integration of the proletariat into certain processes
engendered and directed by profit." Consciousness that capitalism is tolerable mUlt henceforth be
built not on "the impossibility of satisfying elementary needs but above all else, in the consciousnes8
of alienation ... the fact that this life ia not wol1h living and hai no meaning, that Ibis ia a
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class-divided system is not to be itself a tool for integrating people into that
system, it can only mean that eacb revolutionaryts means must meet a certain
criterion supplied by the end of autonomous bunwrity. -Revolutionary morality-
requires first aiming at sucb hunwrity in the future, partially realizing it in the
present througb revolutionary action, and judging all means by tbeir barmony
or disharmony with all the otber elements of this undertaking.
Sartre articulates this solution to -the ethical problem- in the course of
four numbered sections (three of which have titles) 'that form tbe body of the
chapter. Eacb treats an example of the birth and control of alienated, -Iimited
moralities. - These moralities correspond rougbly to the following four stages of
transformation of tbe status quo: (1) The initial revolutionary impulse may be
to restore a known if alienated past rather than undertake tbe risks of creating
a novel future. (2) As the insurrectional phase mobiIizes, the organizational
apparatus may eitber be foolishly sacrificed for pure ends or made an end in
itself, thereby falling ioto either a self-defeating leftism, or a maintenance of tbe
apparatus tbat substitutes for revolutionary praxis. (3) As iosurrection advances,
terror, if it is necessary, risks becoming an ideology or even a system of
govemance, especially if counter-revolutionary forces are strong. (4) Finally, as
local obstacles are overcome, the revolution risks universalizing itself as a
particular incamation of socialism, imposing itself elsewhere and thereby
distorting otber struggles, as weil as itself.
These four Iimited moralities entail risks to the socialist task that emanate
from that task itself. Yet Sartre claims that all the ways to control these risks
also emaoate from that same task, tbus bolding out tbe possibility of correcting
revolutionary means in light of revolutionary ends. In each case Sartre seeks to
show how these risky -limited moralities- arise as useful, even unavoidable tools
of change, bow tbey proceed to endanger their goal of integral bumanity, and
how they may nevertheless still be controlled by -morality- precisely in light of
that goal.
Letts then review Sartrets four examples of sucb moralities.
1) Instituting a past state 0/ affairs as -natural. - (This is our title.) The
property rights ethic of the capitalist class is alienated because it subordinates
dcecptivc meehanisffi, that these needs ... only serve profit.· From ·Frenee: Masses, Spontaneity,
Party· (1972) in Between Exis'enlialism and Marx;sna, tranl. lohn Mathewi (New York: Pantheon,
1974), pp. 124-125.
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humans to things. In France after 1789 this class sought to add political power
to its already-established economic power. It conceived its affmity for property
as "natural," a propensity inherent in all humans 'that merely awaited uncovering
(or re-institution) by political action-as against the "unnatural" hierarchy of the
landed aristocracy. It invoked Greek and Roman iconograpby. At first coinciding
with tbe liberation of large sectors of the masses, this past-oriented ethic became
"particularized" by the favor capitalism awards capital interests. Meanwhile,
made sub-human by the new system, propertyless workers actually have no
"interests," only needs. "Socialist praxis" is stimulated by lack of both political
and economic power on the part of those "unfavored" by capitalism. Yet such
praxis aims at neither, according to Sartre, seeking instead "the simple naked
power of the exploited to be human, whatever their real power in the produetive
forces might be. " (149/124) The object of their need is humanity, a pure future
that does not already exist. The very possibility of grasping this power can incite
a fear of freedom and noveIty. Thus: "praxis, inside a present-past system, ;S
afraid of being pure future. Against the system, it must constitute a pasl."
(150/124) Though genuinely opposing the status quo, revolutionary morality
may thus initially reinstate an alienated but familiar pasl.
To illustrate, Sartre points to the early stages of the Aigerian Revolution.
After nearly one hundred years of French occupation, the first impulse of
insurgents in the mid-1950's was to restore a lost sovereignty. This was partly
symbolized by bringing back the chador or veil for women, with all the
subordination implied. But since this earlier state of freedom from colonial role
was itself alienated, restoring that past could not yield liberation. Integration ioto
the present is equally impossible, dominated as it is by what Sartre aptly calls
"the club of man," i.e., the exclusive culture of the colonizer. Blocked against
flight into the past, or integration into the present, no alternative is left Aigerians
besides plunging into the future and "inventing humanity" through independence.
A "realistic" revolutionary will not tear the chador off but will oppose it while
constantly re-directing attention to this difficult task of invention without models.
In this way, the alienated morality of restoring a lost sovereignty need not
deviate the revolutionary movement's pursuit of the "pure future," since that
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morality can be "limited" by consideration of that end and re-directed toward
it.21
2) "Moral ;nsu"ect;onal ach;evement" (Sartre's title). Dominance by "the
system" over praxis continues only so long as tbe masses are serialized and
hence impotent. To resist effectively, "a practical union against the system" in
favor of a "non-existent moral society" is required. (152/126) However,
effectively opposing the system injects imperatives into the insurgent union that
come from the system ilself. System-generated repression exists, and this fact
renders instantaneous pure group praxis impossible. To oppose the system's
negation requires a "counter-system": a "revolutionary organization" or "party"
or "organism" or "apparatus" that helps individuals avoid intemalizing
repression and tums such negation back upon its tnae source. 22 Such a
"provisional means" points radically beyond the present, but must meanwhile
also operate within it. In describingthe problems facins the organization, Sartre
subtly but scathingly criticizes the Communist Parties represented in his
audience, and offers a corrective.
·Praxis requires" maintaining the revolutionary organization in readiness
for the insurrectional moment, according to Sartre. Yet, since party
functionaries' "mterest" is in their jobs, they can confusethis requirement of
praxis with the permanent availability of the party w;th;n the existing system.
Thus confounding their own system-generated interests with the norm of pure
future, these functionaries may measure members' devotion to revolution by the
unconditionality of their faith in tbe apparatus. When 'this happens "the end [that
is, liberatory revolution] becomes tbe means of the means." (153/127)
Revolution-taUe then serves to cover up the assimilation of revolutionaries into
existing structures of power.
21Sartre bad no illulionaabout the actual reaulta of the revolutionary movemcnt for independence
in Algena bctween 1956 and 1961. In an carlief ehapter of 7Ite 1964 Rome Lec.ure, he aaid that thil
revolution had aucccedcd not in uahering in an effcctive aocialilm but ooly in moving from de jure
atatutory colony to de fac.o cconomic colony, a modelt but real progreaa withal.
228y contrast, and in the context of ontology, Sartre'I dcacription of bad faith in Bein, and
Nolhingness il of a "conacioulneu, (whieh) inllead of direeting itl negation outwardl, tuma it
toward itaelf." (p. 48) For a diacullion of Ibe ori,inl of bad faith in real aocial reprellion, sec
Robert V. Stonc, "Sartre on Bad Faith aOO Authenticity,· in The Philosophy 01Jean-Paul Sartre,
cd. Paul Arthur Schilpp (LaSane: Open Court, 1981).
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Avoiding tbis alienation requires constant practice of cr;l;c;sm at the
revolutionary group's base, criticism capable of changing leadership. Humanity
makes itself "reflexively, " Sartre says, by critical "axiological" reflection on the
action by which it produces itself. This means retlecting not just on alienated
products, but on one's own actions that produced them. Democratic
centralism-requiring defeated minorities within the apparatus to portray the
majority position as their own all along-is to be avoided. "The problem,"
Sartre says, "is to give to the masses the possibility of dissolving the heing
[I'elre] of the leaders.... " such that "the masses surpass their oWD leaders."
(154/127) The apparalos seeks not to wield existing levels of political and
economic power; it seeks rather to prepare the masses within the system to
produce "integral bumanity." It does so by providing "the framework in which,
by dissolving limited moralities, the masses leam bumanity as unconditional
demand." (154/127)
Yet this "apparatus," composed as it is of those experienced in struggle,
is itself needed. Wildcat strikes outside the apparatus mayaiso posit humanity;
however, "because [such strikes] do not discriminate between immediate and
distant objectives, they vanish without traces whether won or lost." (154/128)
Similarly, a revolutionary strike, when an unfavorable balance of force risks
failure and breakup of the apparatus, should be stoppe(1. The apparalos, by
linking immediate with distant objectives, provides both a "consolidation of
progress" and a "synthetic memory" of mass stroggles.
There is a "dialectical tension" within the revolutionary project between
conserving the organization as means and realizing humanity as its end. This
tension is healthy. Its component tendencies are "opportunism" and "Ieftism" in
Sartre's appellation. Opportunism is "conserving the means while changing ~he
end." "Leftism" is "Ietting the means perish rather than not affirm the
unconditional end." Each needs the other as corrective. Opportunism and
leftism, or at least tendencies loward them, are in fact bOlh necessary "for moral
praxis." (155/129) Moral praxis is the linking of (opportunism's focus on)
immediate efficaciousness to (leftism's focus on) the ultimate end.23 Only
23Under this robric, we should label Hugo and Hoederer, the main protagonis18 of Sartre'l play
Dirty Rands (1948), es leftilt end opportunist, relpectively. Hugo and hil sponSOR ere willing to
risk fatally injuring the epperatus in order to keep revolutionary action pure end untainted by
compromise with clasa enemiea. Hoederer is willing to make such compromisea in the present in
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through such linking is revolution possible. Sartre holdsthat non-revolutionary
reforDlS, however deep, that are aimed opportunistically at preserving the
present system, will yield only illusory progress since "it is impossible for
humanity to be bom if sub-humanity [merely] advances on its suh-humanity.
Humanity can only be bom from humanity." (155/129)
Even as sub-humans posit humanity in resisting their condition, they risk
heing made sub-human again by their own apparatus of struggle, if it treats them
as passive means. "This would be to alienate man to the future just as the
system alienates him to the past." (155/130) If individual revolutionary action
is not to be stolen from its initiator, or its import lost by isolation from the
instrument for registering collective progress, then there must be a democratic
process within the revolutionary organization. Revolutionaries may not fully
transcend their "sub-human" status through such a process hut they will
"incamate the humanity [they] realize," even if that incamation is necessarily
"abstract" in relation to general liberation.
When such an organization functions properly, moral praxis will have a
"normative" but not an "imperative" aspect. A leader's command is normative
if it emanates from the shared goal of realizing the form of norms, which is the
"unconditional possibility of integral humanity... A command is imperative if it
asymmetrically reduces freedom to the task of realizing the conlenl of a norm.
Sartre's example of such alienated imperatives is the use Stalin made of Marx's
doctrine of the "withering away of the state." According to Sartre, Stalin meant
that the state disappears as it is "installed in each person as an apparatus of
constraint," (158/132) that is, as state repression is intemalized by its victims.
Clearly, for Sartre, the USSR and East European countriesfailed to synthesize
order to gain strategic advanla,e for the entirc movement lator. 80th perapectivel are necessary for
revolulionary lucceSI. They Are not sufficien. for lUch IUccell, however, and indeed the play aeems
Lo show rcvolutionary praxil in 1948 il compromiaed at the ltaft by Hugo'l murder of Hoederer,
apparcntly out of personal jealouly. On the accalion of a performance of Dirty Rands in ltaly in
1964, Sartre, already in Rome, indicated to an ltalian interviewer, two monthl be/ore the Rome
lecturc, thai he would be retuming to the problema of thil play in the forthcoming lecture. See
Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, 7he Wrllings 0/Jean-Paul Sanre, trans. R. McCleary, Vol. I
(Evanston: Northwestem Univeraity Prel., 1914), pp. 191-193. If Hocderer caMot bring together
opportunism and leftism, it mi,ht be arped that Goetz, the revolutionary hero of Saftre'l 1951 play
The Devil and Ihe Good Lord, does exemplify thil Iynthesil, At least as an individual, and in
somewhat ideal tenns.
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opportunism and leftism, erring in the direction of an opportunism that made the
apparatus an end in itself.
In an uncanny anticipation of the "revolution of 1989," Sartre concludes
tbis second sub-section on the revolutionary apparatus by noting optimistically
that while praxis will always tend to "crystallize" into a system,
one musl also know that this cryataUization cannot lose humanit)' forever, for
humanit)' ia itself the real blsis of this limitation upon it, Ind from Ibis viewpoint, it
will certainl)' contest its new .ub-humanit)'.s IOOn la thi. is po••ible. (158/132)
One could argue in the case of Bastern Europe, that this contestation became
possible near the end of 1988, when Soviet leaders gave Poland assurances of
non-intervention. The subsequent uprisings seem to illustrate what Sartre calls
in The 1964 Rome Leetures the "irrepressibility of humanity as the future of
humanity." (158/133)
3) "The Necessity 0/ Praxis" (Sartre's titte). The tie Iinking immediate
objectives and long-term goals is stretched most during the "night-time
moments" of making the human when the revolutionary leadership must engage
in terror and Iying. By "necessity" Sartre intends the reduction of possibilities
to one. When action has such "inflexible rigor," he asks, doesn't it exclude the
unconditional end? If there's but one way to humanity and it involves means
incompatible with a human world, isn't action with humanity as its end
impossible? Sartre's answer is no. Humanity as end can still turn back on the
means and "contra." them.
He does not envision using humanity as a means. Terror is characterized
as action in which "sub-humans become the means of humanity." (159/133)
Such action "born of the masses" is inherentty defensive, being "forced by the
adversary." Terror not only re-introduces imperative orders, it accompanies
them with "sanctions. " Sartre names no sanctions, but he alludes to "the violent
liquidation of private interests and of old classes" (161/135) and to the Russian,
Cuban, and Algerian revolutions. Paradoxically, "one maintains these sanctions
in order to suppress them." (159/133)
The original situation facing the practical organism is for Sartre one of
workaday violence. Sartre is ambiguous as to whether he is talking of
bureaucratic socialism or capitalism. "The system" in either case makes all its
participants sub-human by its unimpeded, normal selection of its victims a prior;
for misery or death, based on their class, race, gender or other irrelevancy. In
183
its original instance terror is for Sartre a counter-violence in which one uses
oneself qua sub-human as a means to one's own humanity beyond the system.
In Moraliry and Hislory he analyzes cases of revolutionary militants who, under
systematic torture by the Nazis (and tbe French), nevertheless conceal their
absent comrades by making their pain-racked bodies, indeed tbeir very lives, the
"absolute" means to the end of silence. Humanityas unconditional end is present
in such cases. Among those who use tbeir sub-humanity in this way there is
"solidarity. " This is neither a merging of persons nor their assimilation into a
higher-order personality. Rather, due to their common aim, the seriality and
alienation of hierarchical society are just dropped. In short, the human
collectivity partly makes tbe human in aiming together at the "pure future."
lnsofar as this effort entails resistance to a violent system (a reluctance that is
always itself defmed as "violent" by the dominant system), the revolutionary
group-if it is to resist at all, much less succeed-must to some degree engage
in violence. Sartre noles:
Kant is wrong. Even in the city of ends man will be both ends Ind melns It the same
time. The ideal moment of Ihe means, il aimply when humana will themselvellueh
in light of the end, end as such the end incamatea itsclf in them in the moment in
which they will themselvelas means (solidlrity). (159/133)
The revolutionary group tben primarily uses itself collectively as its own
means. May it use other sub-humans outside the group as means'? Sartre does
not seem to exclude this and it seems to us hannonious with bis overall position,
assuming the validity of revolutionary action in the first place. He proceeds to
discuss the four conditions under which alone terror, Iying, etc.-in general,
using sub-humans, through imperatives witb sanctions, to create humans-really
might count as "inevitable" and therefore permissible. If any of these conditions
cannot be met, we read Sartre as saying, tben terror is not permissible and other
alternatives must be invented. The conditions are:
(1) Only when terror can be restrained from becoming a "system" like that
of the adversary.
But the terrorist's ItNggle must be pursued 1I I provilional expedient. It ia
Ihe Idversary who forcel him to make humanl the pure Ind limple means to
humanity. The terrorilt mUlt in thlt elae aense the Other in himaelf (IS the Other
denied but eonserved 1I thrclt) in produeing Ind maintainina Terror 1I I sYltem.
(159/134)
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Provisional and defensive terror is necessary (Le., the only alternative), we
interpret Sartre as saying here, only when it can be kept from becoming a
system. It would seem that treating humans as means only (without also treating
them as ends) can 't be restrained from becoming a system. If using terror in a
given case would tend to use humanity as a means only, then that use would not
be permissible.
(2) Qnly if those who exercise terror can and do avoid "ideologies" of
terror. An example is Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country." This
slogan was used to rationalize re-instituting sub-humanity precisely among those
struggling against it. 24
(3) Only if no justification of terror is offered beyond its necessity. If one
does not struggle against terror while applying it one maintains sub-humans in
their sub-humanity. Thus one must: strictly limit its exercise; present it as
inhuman to those who undergo it; never use it as the easiest solution; and never
in order to cover amistake.
(4) Only if terror originales in the masses and is "assumed [by] the leaders
in their turn." (160/134) But it must be assumed as "unjustifiable" and in the
name of alle If terror is thus grounded in what Sartre calls "fraternity-terror,"
rather than in some claim to legitimate power, then it can give way to
fratemity .2S
~n CDR 11 Sartre had analyzed Ihree aspeetl of terror in Ihe USSR of Ihe ]930'8: the
"fabrieating" of a working eiasl out of peasanta in order to indultrialize rapidly; the forced
eoUeetivization of agrieulture; and the reverberation of terror within the bureaueraey whieh "must
be al one" (see elp. pp. 176-179). AI a requirement of praxil luch terror mlgh, still have been
abandoned, onee itl tasie of unifyin, the Itnl"le had been aeeomplished, but for the
institutionalization of ideologiealilogani lilee "aocialilm in one eountry." (CDR 11, p. 164).Thil
eoneeptual "monltrolity," whieh Iplit the Soviet proletariat from the other proletariata it needed, had
initiaUy been invented to defeat Trotsleyi8t universalism. But it then went on to help eodify in ltate
power the hierarchieization of both the bureaueraey and the proletariat, two eontemporaneoul
developments whose legitimation aetually made aocialilm less likely. (CDR 11, pp. 103-101) Cf.
Aronson, Sartre 's Second Crilique, pp. 102-113.
2510 CDR I terror had been pOl1rayed as a given stnleture of the system, an inevitable strueture
of resistanee to it, and a taeit source of unity within the insurgent movement. Terror wilhin the
revolutionary movement ia "fratemity-terror." (See note 10 above.) Thil refen to the ltanding link
between memben of the "pledged group." The anteeedent birth (in Sattre'l dialeetie) of
revolutionary militants as "common individuali" <an individual whose praxil ia common) gives to
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, Maya Nazi torturer in occupied France be assassinated even if one knows
doing so will result in the retributive murder of several arbitrarily selected
fellow citizens? The example is OUfS. It seems to us that if the resulting
retribution held the real prospect of awakening large numbers of one's fellow
citizens to the need for solidarity and resistance, then the assassination, itself an
indirect use of sub-humanity in one's victims and fellow citizens, might meet
Sartre's four requirements (to the third of which he in fact appended a few
more). Terror, Sartre holds, is "always a revolutionary pause" which "marks
history negatively." Yet, if these four conditions are met, "Terror becomes
revolulionary juslice. In short, the humanization of terror is possible in
principle. "
.- Sartre seems to want to allow only insurrectional, popular terror such as
occurred against the Nazis (and against the French in Algeria), not the
institutionalized terror of the USSR and Bastern European regimes that made
terror an ideologically justified system of govemance. In 1962 he foresaw a
popular revolution against Soviet socialism, which had become "a synonym with
Hell. ,,26 In 1964 whom does Sartre envision bringingthis about? The system-
created "man of Terror" is "the least capable of realizing the permanent self-
destruction of the terrorized system." (161/135) Such change must come from
"benealh the ideology of terror and its practices. "
The unconditional nonnative ia here aLto the foundation of the imperative. The
transfonnation of the fundamental Itnacturel of the Iystem (raising the standard of
livin" elc.) by makinl terror unnecelsary does not auppresl ita mark, but the
uncondilioned end is discovered again and praxis takel it al loal, startinl with the
pursuit of the real revolutionary end of liquidating the limits of terrorism.
It is terror-men who liquidate the Terror in themselvel. (161/136)
each member of the group thul constituted the right lo violate the frcedom of olher members-in
order to &ave the group al such from dilsolution. (CDR I, pp. 428-444)
26CDR 11, p. 116.
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This passage scems again in some ways to anticipate the uprisings in Eastem
Europe and the Soviet Union, initiated against the remnants of Stalin's system
of terror-in the midst of its attempts to reform itself.27
4) "!ncarnat;on" (Sartre's title) The sub-section with this tille deals with
issues of defending soeialist gains, in particular the thomy question of the
relation of revolutionary parties and groups outside the Soviet Union to the
Soviet Union. Yet Sartre's dialectic of means and ends seems also to pertain to
any new attempts to make the human.
Communism is the suppression of all Iystems. The praetieo-inel1 appears in
it only to be dissolved. But socialiam il Itill a system. The praetico-inert exists in a
socialist society. More to the point: luch a society realizel itaelf as a eel1ain
individuality (traditions, historieal circumltanees).... The neeessity ofhistory is that
the universal is never realized in it exeept in the form of singularity. This is what I
ean incamalion. (161/136jZ8
Sartre speaks of defense of the Soviet Union and other attempts to build
socialism as an "obligation." Yet he counter-balances this obligation with the
cognate obligation to surmount the particularity both of these struggles elsewhere
and of one's own loeal apparatus of struggle. No single nation embodies the
universal, no organizational entity is the "home" of socialism itself, so long as
capitalism endures.
How, then, does Sartre propose to effect this delicate balance of perhaps
conflicting "obligations" within the movement of universalization? By "ethics."
Ethics here is the "surpassing" of singularity, not its mere "negation. " Particular
27Cf. CDR 11, p. 144. In CDR 11, and in such passages as this in 7he 1964 Rome uClure, Sal1re
still envisioned a reformist-though not necessarily peaceful-overthrow of the Soviet bureaucraey
by Soviet workers within the basic Boishevik projeet. (CDR 11, p. 164n) But in 1968, after the
Soviets invaded Czeehoslovakia, he wrote that lethe maehine eannot be repaired; the peoples of
Eastern Europe must seize hold or it and destroy it." "Czeehoslovakia: The Socialism that Came in
from the Cold," in Between Marxism and Exislenlialism, op. Cil., p. 117.
28Cf. CDR 11, p. 22 for a general characterization ofthis idea, which is refractory to any attempt
to eompare an ideal socialism with a ease of it. Thus Marxism is for good or ill "incarceraled by
beeoming anational and popular eulture" in the USSR. In this ineamation Marxism both changes
the "hastily-ereated" Soviet working class and is changed by it. (CDR 11, p. 109) Aronson in Sartre's
Second Crilique remarks "Sal1re's analysis does show a eorruption of Marxism in its inearnation."
(p. 183)
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socialist attainments are to be neither imitated nor negated, but built upon. To
achieve the emancipation of workers it is not enough to blindly pursue it; "the
clear representation of the essential end" of that emancipation is also required.
This calls for creation of "an ethics of history. or to identify history witb tbe
dramatic overdevelopment of morality. " (162/137)
In these four ways, then, the "morality of praxis" botb gives rise to
"alienated moralities" as temporary means to human liberation and also limits
these moralities in the light of this same end, such that they are useful without
freezing into permanent and oppressive ends in themselves. Ultimately it is
hoped tbat group praxis becomes its own end and that need, instead of impelling
os to re-ereate a system, becomes a mere occasion forthe inherently worthwbile
collective problem-solving that beats back the practico-inert. Morality, as tbe
practice ofcriticism within tbe expanding revolutionary group, mediates the slow
triumph of bumanity over sub-bumanity. Tbe task is complex. Revolutionaries
are in tbe contradictory position both of creating a system to combat a system
and yet affirming the preeminence of humanity over all its systems. Tbey must
therefore struggle against botb tbe system and the counter-system, even as they
use the latter.
There is a risk that stroggling against the revolutionary system will destroy
the revolutionary force itseif. This risk must be run, Sartre affirms. This is
because "the blind reinforcement of the [revolutionary] system risks subjecting
humanity to an alienation not of exploitation but of oppression." (164/139)
Revolutionaries must hold firm to the norm of "unconditional bumanity" in
opposition both to tbe system's imperatives and to those which struggle imposes
on tbem. The latter imperatives are to be respected as provisional but not
definitive in light of "autonomy of praxis" as the goal. It may even happen that
the revolutionary force itself must be sacrificed, yielded up, if "blind
reinforcement of the [revolutionary] system" would sink sub-humans even more
deeply ioto their sub-bumanity, instead of advancing in tbeir humanity. Clearly
Sartre is willing for this sacrifice to be made since sub-humanity in all its forms,
wbether imposed by the system or the counter-system, is itself a limitation on
or diversion of our underlying bumanity. This fact allows for hope, despite the
most grievous alienation, that humanity will "find itself again" due to the
"irrepressible" future, the autonomy of praxis that is pointed to by sheer human
need.
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3. Situating Chapter Four
Simone de Beauvoir, upon re-reading The 1964 Rome Leeture in 1986, called
it "the culminating point of Sartre's ethics. ,,29 We find this phrase apt. It
suggests a buildup including earHer attempts, subsequent efforts that do not
attain its level, and perhaps overall failure to reach its goal-all of which seems
to us to be true of tbis work. Wbat Sartre designated as "the problem of ethics"
he never solved to his satisfaction (or to OUrs-BS we explain briefly below). He
planned but never pubHshed a work on ethics. He made three attempts at it: one
in 1947-1950 as a practical sequel to bis ontology of freedom in Being anti
Nothingn.ess-an assault abandoned in the preparatory stages; another in 1964-
1965 BS a practical sequel to bis analysis of the components of historical action
in Critique 0/Dialeetical Reason-a MOre successful effort that reached a high
level and which he always hoped to complete30; and finally, in discussions
with a young associate shortly before he died, he announced a plan in 1980 for
yet another assault-in whose stated terms we find Httle advance over the two
works of the mid-1960's.31
Wbile ehapter Four's "socialist morality" derives directly from the study
of historical action in the Critique, it also draws together humanist themes of the
1940's. It recalls one of Sartre's few "positive" plays in which socialist values
are ringingly affinned amidst rigorous struggle against oppression, namely 1he
Victors (1946).32 It also calls to mind his critique of official Marxism's
deterministic materialism in "Materialism and Revolution" (1946). In that essay
he had insisted that it is precisely in regard to workers' transcendence of Jhe
29Letter postmarked February 21, 1986 to R.V. Stone.
~ichel Contat and Michel Rybalka, The Wrilings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Volume I: A
BibliographicalUfe, trans. Richard McCleary (Evanston: Nor1hwestem University Press, 1974), pp.
448-449.
31Jean-Paul Sartre and Benny Uvy, L'espo;r ma;n'enan,: les entreliensde 1980 (Paris: Verdier,
1991), pp. 22-41.
32WMorts sans sepulture, Win Thea're (Paris: Ciallimard, 1941); wThe VictorJ, Wtrans. Lionel
Abet, in Three Plays (New York: Knopf, 1949). Arguabty, The Devil anti 'he Good Lord (1951) is
simitarty positive.
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given in favor of a future (albeit their bosses, future)-in a word, their
freedom-that they can be said to be oppressed. Oppression could not be
imposed on them if they really were, as the then-dominant Marxism said, bits
of extemally determined matter.33 And finally, it calls to mind the writer's
task-outlined in What is Literature? (1947)-of -representing- the end of
proletarian struggle as freedom, thereby facilitating the -inventing- of -man,-
with socialism as the -last means- to do it. According to that task, any means
of attaining freedom and humanity whose use would -qualitatively- change that
end must be avoided.34 Yet in its suggestions for controlling revolutionary
violence so as to avoid a system of terror, Chapter Four recalls most not any
work of Sartre's but rather Simone de Beauvoir's lengthy discussion of the
permissibility of violence in her 1947 work The Ethics 0/Ambiguity.
Existentialist ethics, especially as developed by Sartre and Beauvoir up to
about 1950, was forged in part to deal with moral problems imposed on those
who had elected to resist the Nazis' military occupation of France from 1940 to
1944. May one kill a 16-year-old Nazi combattant who is mystified and misled,
if the urgency of armed struggle for freedom precludes re-educating him? May
one violently oppose an anti-eolonial revolt against one's ally, Britain, if the
revolt's leaders reject postponement and if prosecuting it now would derail the
wider struggle against fascism? What should one do with a stool-pigeon
discovered in the resistance network? Maya resistance militant eliminate three
Nazi officers if he knows an entire French village will be bumed in retribution?
Such questions-which have no obvious answers-seem out of place in the USA
33when bosses accuse worken of -80rdid materialism- official Marxista often defend them by
abandoning their own materialism, Sartre had noted, and thereby inconsistently ·give one to
understand that behind these malerial demand. there wa. the affirmation of a humanism, that these
worken were not only demandinga few more sous, but that their demand wa. a kind of concrete
symbol of their demand to be men. Men; that is, freedoßll in pos8Cssion of their own destiniea. •
·Malerialism and Revolution, - in literary and Philosoph;cal Essays, trans. Annette MichelIOn (New
York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 229.
34Whal ;s lileralure? trans. Bemard Frechtman (London: Methuen, 1950), pp. 213-14, 211.
·We must, in al1 domains, both reject IOlutioDl which Ire not rigorously inspired by socialist
principles and, at the same time, aland ofT from 111 doctrinea and movementa which consider
aocialilm as the absolute end. In our eyea it ahould not repreaent the final end, but rather the end
of Ihe beginning, or, if one prefen, the lalt means before the end which is to pul the human person
in possession of his freedom.· p. 206.
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of 1992, a country .which is not only comfortable, but which has never suffered
military occupation by a victorious enemy. In the course of treating such
questions in her Cha~terThree, Beauvoir evolves some guidelines for ·vigilant·
pursuit of freedom. S Terror must be used only to avoid a greater evil, only
as a last resort, only as a temporary expedient, and never as an institution, as
in the case of Stalinism. Setting down in greater detail ideas Sartre was to return
to less compellingly seventeen years later, she pointed upthe dialectical relation
of means and ends in the ethics of revolution by remarking that
. . . an action which wants to &erve man ought to be careful not to forget him on the
wayj if it ChOO&e8 to fulfill itaelf blindly, it will lose its meaning or take on an
unforeseen meaning; for the goal i. not fixed once and for all; it i. defined along the
road which leads to it. Vigilance Ilone can keep alive the validity ofthe goals and the
genuine assertion of freedom.36
What, then, is the relation of the socialist morality of 1964 to the
existential ethics that Sartre had himself projected in 1943 in Being and
NOlhingness? We suggest, though we cannot make out the argument in detail
here,that the socialist morality lays out certain elements of this projected ethics
in Ihe form ofan hislorical/praetical projeet.
Having devoted most of Being and Nothingness to describing the
"ambiguous" structures of human reality, particularly its "serious" attitude of
presenting itself "as a consequence, " Sartre had promised at the end of that work
an ethical treatise that would describe the "special type of being" characteristic
of humans at play.37The serious attitude of taking bread as desirable because
;1 is nourishing is a pursuit of being that is in bad faith because it "hides from
3SThe E'hics 01Ambigui", trans. Bemard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948),
pp. 98-99, 149-150. One ofthe many dilemmas explored in Sartre's The Vic'ors ia: while in cu.tody
awaiting torture may one kill a Resistance comrade before he 's tortured if he professe. his inability
to conceal (and willingness to revell) large &ectors of the network in order to ave his life and
sanity?
36The Ethics 01 Ambigui", p. 153. For a discussion of 8eauvoir'. influence on Sartre, see
Margaret A. Simons, "Beauvoir and Sartre: The Question of Inßuence," in Eros: A Journal 01
Philosophy anti U'erary AlU, Vol. 8, No. I, June 1981.
37SN, p. 581. See the epigraph above.
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[itself] the free project whieh is this pursuit. -J8 Tbis attitude wrongly "asserts
the priority of the object over the subject. ,,39 But if this attitude is morally
deficient. as Sartre implies, must it not be because it is possible to reverse tbis
priority and make the subject-the' human itself-the object pursued? Desiring
to found its own contingent existence through its self-eonsciousness. human
reality originally takes as its ideal the type of being that 000 has40-an
impossible ideal whose dogged pursuit makes humanity a "useless passion. ,,41
Within tbis original or given project (wbieh need not be one's fundamental
project) human reality can make itself its own objective, Sartre has already held
in Being and Nothingness, and thereby at least "put an end to the reign of this
value [of being 000]. ,,42 But when human reality effects such a "conversion."
what'else can it become if not the historical project of making the human. as
described in The 1964 Rome Leeture1 In "living" freedomts ehoice of itself as
its new ideal. Sartre had suggested in 1943, freedom will "situate" itself as
"conditioned" in order to assume "its responsibility as an existent by wbom the
world comes into being...43 Isn't this precisely the responsibility for a human
world that is experienced in historieal terms by the revolutionary as described
in 19641
Yet we besitate to say 1he 1964 Rome Leeture is the projected ethics.
Sartre is proposing here more a eertain undertaking than he is an ethies in the
sense of a principle for realizing moral values through individual conduet. as is
proposed. say. by Kant or Mill. Such prineiples presume it is possible to be
moral in class society without having the overthrow of that society as one's first








"socialist ethics" the "demand" for "humanity" implicit in need constitutes an
"exigency" that might better be called pre-moral or prolo-moral. The object of
this exigency can itself become the objective of moral striving; moreover. it
must be if anY other moral value is to be capable of realization. Freedom. like
humanity, is what might be called a threshold value inasmuch as its universal
realization is a condition for the authentie realization by an individual of any
value whatsoever. To be moral. indeed to realize any value, one must first be
free, since only free conduet can be ealled morally right or wrong. As Linda A.
Bell rightly notes, tbis means freedom is willed implicitly as means in willing
any value whatever as end.44 But then such eollective liberation seems aimed
not so much at satisfying some partieular morality as at making moralities in
general possible in the first place by realizing humanity. In terms of socialist
morality, action aimed at satisfying this or that historically dominant moral
imperative, value. or ideal, is parasitie upon, rides piggy-back on, the power of
invention in ordinary historieal praxis. But if being moral is impossible due to
alienation by class society of this very power in praxis, there seems to be a
morally prior task of making morality itself possible. Because the practico-inert
always haunts praxis. this task has its own inner moral structure, and this is
what is described in Chapter Four.
4. Evaluating Chapter Four
One strength of Sartre's aeeount is that it avoidsthe dangers of a eertain
metaphor often used in thinking about revolutionary ends and means. A fami liar,
perhaps dominant. way of posing the issue of the morality of revolution goes as
folIows: Does the end of revolution. the better state of humanity sought as its
goal.justify or outweigh the violent. perhaps immoral. acts undertaken as means
necessary to attain that end? If a means is indeed immoral then. it may. be
argued. it can " be outweighed by good ends, but in that case there is 00 point
in asking the question whether it can (unless it is simply to evoke a prejudice
against revolutionary change). The question in any case presumes that
revolutionary means ean be conceived as external to, and then weighed morally
on the opposite side of the scale from, the revolutionary ends toward which they
44Cf. Linda A. Bell's diacussion ofthis in Sartre's Elhics 01AUlhenticity (fuscaloosa: University
of Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 55-57.
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aim. But this also reveals a prejudice in the question. For, since ends are
precisely the sorts of things that give point and intelligibility to means in the first
place (if anything does), once one diseogages any means from its end, such that
it can be weighed morally aga;nsl its end, it will already certainly appear at
least pointless and will more likely be laken as morally wrong. The burden of
proof-due to the conceptual prejudices buHt into the "scale" metaphor itself-is
thus made unduly heavy for the revolutionary.
Sartre offers an alternative to the scale metaphor that allows us to
disinterestedlyappreciate the moral problems of revolution. The scale metaphor
treats acts as means and ends as something beyond acts. But means and ends,
instead of being morally separable and weighable, are held by Sartre to be
interconnected "moments" of actual historical undertakings. Ends donttjuslify
means, strictly speaking; they are rather their very point and meaning. This is
indicated in the ambiguity inthe French word sens, which signifies both
direction or vector and meaning. Thus Sartre says ends are "the synthetic unity"
of means, the unfolding of all the means. In a word, the end is the "totalization"
of the means (except when it is interrupted, leaving a "de-totalized totality"
which is nevertheless comprehended through the end it was aiming at).45 For
Sartre, humanity is not something that can be preparedfor, e.g. by nationalizing
factories; it is rather all the acts, starting now, of creating it. The end does not
come after the means; it is rather the significance that permeatestheir
deployment in history and holds them together as means. The means, in turn,
by concretizing the end in a particular situation, come to incamate it in
unintended as weil as intended ways. Thus ends don't justify acts; they are the
parts of acts that make up their very intelligibilityas human doings rather than
mere events or processes. Similarly with means: they are constituent parts or
moments of acls. Being inseparable aspecls of a single movement that unifies
itself as it goes along, means and ends cantt be weighed against each olber, as
ODe might weigh, say, proposed alternative acts against each other with respect
to their consequences. Revolution is a task, a complex of acts. If anything, both
revolutioDary means and revolutionary ends should be together on the same side
of the moral scale, to be weighed morally against action on the other side. On
Sartre's analysis of means and ends, then, the initial question, which presumes
45CDR I, pp. 45-46.
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their moral separa~ility, is meaningless. It is made from an impossible supra-
historical perspective and misconstrues the structure of human action.
Toward the end of Chapter Four Sartre writes: "All means are good except
those which denature the end." (164/139) In 1947 he wrote that means can be
so incompatible with their end as to •smash" the syntheses they are supposed to
help constitute.46 This provides us with a criterion for revolutionaries. If we
provisionallyaccept Sartre's replacement ofthe idea that means arejustified (or
not) by their ends, with the idea that means "denature" (or exemplify) their
ends, then two questions arise: (1) Does the end of revolutionary action
harmonize with any and all means, or are 'there limits, are there means that do
"de-natur~" or "smash" the "synthetic unities" or "totalizations" of which they
are apart? And (2) ifthe revolutionary end is not compatible with certain means
is this because a moral principle external to the revolutionary task itself
supervenes for Sartre in order to guide good choices of means?
We can see that Sartre's answer to the first question is "yes," there are
limits. We've just considered means that have a limited efficacity, but which,
if allowed to dominate action, would undermine their end, and which therefore
require consideration of that end if they are to be controlIed and Iimited.
Another even more compelling example of what the socialist ethics rules out is
supplied by Sartre's bitter denunciation in The Ghost 01Stalin of Soviet premier
Khrushchev's invasion of Hungary with Soviet troops in 1956 to quell a
workers' rebellion-a means that "smashes" the task of empowering workers.
46"The end is the synthetie unity of the means employed," Sartre held, in Whal ;s Uleralure?,
drawing the eonelusion "Thus there Ire melns which risk destroying the end which they inlend to
realize because by their mere presence they smash the Iynthetic unity which they wish to enler. "
(Whal is Uleralure?, p. 218) Certain melns mUlt 80metimel be rejected not because they are
quantitatively less efTective, but because, even if they are more efTective, they "introduce a
qualilative alteration into the end and eonsequently are not measurable." (p. 282) Even at that, a
partieular ease of Iying by the revo1utionary party may be pennissible, despite perpetuating the
oppression it would end, if it would reany tend 10 ereate I world where Iying is unneeessary. Such
Iying is nol pennissible "... if it helps to ereate a lied-Io and lying mankind; for then the men who
take power are no longer those who deserve 10 hold it; and the reasons one had for abolishing
oppression are undennined by the way he goes Ibout Ibolishing it." (p. 282)
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It shows clearly how "the rule of efficacity" would exclude conduct by the
revolutionary force that denatures or intemally upsets the end it aims at.47
To the second question. however. Sartre's answer is a perhaps unexpected
"no." Contrary to the liberal tradition in morals. Sartre argues that "praxis"
supplies its own moral limits. There is no autonomous morality with apriori
validity for praxis. Instead there iSt as bis tille implies. a "morality of praxis"
itself (wbich has autonomy as a goal). No extra-historical moral principle is
appealed to here.
As we have seen. the absence of an extemal standard does not mean all
means are permitted. Sartre even goes to the point of saying "the revolutionary
force" itself must be sacrificed if its perpetuation would denature the
revolutionary goal of autonomous humanity. This opens up the risk that Sartre's
standard. wbich is intemal to the revolutionary struggle against the system.
could be used by defenders of the system against revolutionaries. Thus. if it is
known in advance by the defenders of the existing system that its opponents will
find certain measures morally unacceptable. then. to defeat revolutions. it will
be enough to so escalate counter-revolutionary violence as to impose on the
revolutionaries the choice of either abandoningthe struggle or engaging in these
measures-since presumably they'll choose the former because they will shrink
from tbe latter. We see no way to secure Sartre's criterion against the risk of
such manipulation. Those using Sartre's own criterion would. however. be more
able to respond in a liberatory manner than would tbose wbo brought an
inflexible. extemal standard to bear on revolutionary praxis. The scale metaphor
alluded to above. if intemalized by revolutionaries. could be used to stop
revolution by a simple process of escalation of violence (by counter-
revolutionaries unrestrained by tbese same scruples). Sartre's socialist morality
is not tbus limited. and does not bave its own defeat buHt into itself. At the same
time. there clearly bave been for Sartre circumstances in wbich it migbt be best
to abandon a given revolutionary force altogether in order to re-group and start
again elsewbere.48
47The GhoSI 0/ SIQU,. (19S6-S7). trans. M.I1h. Fletcher (New York: Georae Braziller. 1968),
p. 4, 66-67, 118-121, and eap. 18-19. The meditation on when violence rclUy Lr ·unavoidable· (pp.
13-24) ia a valuable complement to ICction 3 of Rome'. eh.pter Four.
48See, for example, note 21 above.
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Yet Sartre's t~eatmentof "socialist morality" (as briefly reviewed here) has
the defects of its virtues. Its virtues are its willingness to specify the ends of
revolution, its freedom from prejudice, and the sheer vastness of the domain of
human affairs that it stakes out as morally pertinent. Yet four central aspects of
this program are, in our judgement, plausible in principle yet incompletely
explained and argued fore
1) We have omitted to focus here on Sartre's critique of capitalism, which
is distributed throughout bis oeuvre and nowhere synthesized. Yet it is important
for his explanation of revolutionary praxis. In general this critique focuses on
the claim that capitalism's devotion to lethe thing," to property and profit over
human ac~ion and human need, suppresses freedom. But socialism is itself also
a system with all its practico-inert limits on freedom. How precisely would
socialism facilitate humanity as the latter's "last means"? How should this
socialism be constructed? This is not a demand for a presumptuous prediction
or a guess at history's direction. But human development seems sufficiently
advanced to allow descriptioD of capitalism as one choice or alternative
possibility and socialism as another. Sartre bad planned to investigate how the
capitalist system is "invented" by "persons" in the second volume of his
Critique. 49 If it is invented by humans, can an alternative also be invented?
And what is its shape, then, as alternative? Unfortunately, neither his critique
of capitalism nor his account of socialism is ample enough for us to be able to
answer these questions decisively. There is no theoretical inhibition in Sartre
against doing so, but he just doesn't give answers.
2) And what precisely is "humanity"? This notion combines a variety of
profound Sartrean themes: freedom; tbe pledged group; satisfaction of need;
group autonomy and individual sovereignty; socialism and communism. But how
exactly does it combine them? Is this goal worth fighting for? In particular, how
might we distinguish, if at all , between Sartrean humanity and the older,
enlightenment conception of humanity that contains "masculinist" prejudices, as
some feminist tbeorists argue? To answer, a Sartrean would need a clear enough
conception of humanity (and its relation to socialism as "last means") to be
useful in deciding, for example, whether a given undertaking will lead to it or
to its opposite. This area of mediations is usually that of politics. But this
dimension is notoriously weak in Sartre's all-or-nothing world view, or rather,
49CDR 11, p. 432.
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the political tends to be subsumed under the moral or the historical. One result
is that there is only the most fragmentary positive theory of democracy in his
work, once bis criticisms of electoral politics are over. This gap might disappear
once capitalism is fully described, on the one hand, and a systematic account of
humanity is given on the other.
3) How exactly does the "de-nature" criterion actually work in
revolutionary practice? If we had a clear answer to this question we could also
answer a related question where revolutionaries would want clarity: when terror
by revolutionaries is and is not permitted. But Sartre is ambiguous on terror.
What types of use of sub-humans to make humanity is he speaking of? Are there
any permissible cases of terror that do not originate among the masses? May
sub-humans outside the revolutionary group be used as means? Tbe entire
section on terror moves at a level of abstraction that leaves such questions
unanswered.
We might be able to answer the questions on terror if we had a clearer
idea of which means "denature" ends. But there is a difficulty in Sartre's
account here. Clearly it is not enough to say a given means alters the end. This
is a dialectical truth of all action as such. All means alter the end by
concretizing it, giving it an iocamatioo, as Sartre says. Someone who goes
straight ahead without taking account of the way means alter ends, can therefore
lose track of where he or she is going and wind up in an unintended place. It
seems that ends guide the choices of means, but ODe cannot strictly deduce
means from ends. But then when can we say an end is not merely altered by its
means or concretized by it, but is "de-natured" by the means? And how, if at
all, can we reasonably anticipale that a given means might de-nature the end it
is meant to help us attain?
Sartre is not alone. The question of revolutionary violence has bedeviled
the tradition of theorizing about revolution and needs re-thinking from the
ground up. so There are resources outside The 1964 Rome Lecture for
conslrucling existential answers to these questions,51 and the overall strength
soA forthcoming book by Joseph Walsh promisca this.
SI As pointed out above, Chapter 3 of Beauvoir'aThe Elhics 0/Ambigulty ia most uscful in this
regard, and almost certainly had Sartre'. concurrence. Violent inaurgent acta are often treated in his
many concrete essays on popular atroggle. in Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba, the Basque country and
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of Sartre's acco~t of the task of liberation argues for doing so. Meanwhile,
though, the 1964 treatment offers only an evocative, ambiguous outIine. Perhaps
for such reasons Sartre did not publish this work.
4) FinaUy, we find in the socialist ethics an uncharacteristically abstract,
rootless quality. Which situation does the revolutionary praxis it describes
respond to? Is he referring primarily to reform of Soviet-dominated regimes, to
revolution in the centers of capitalism, or on its periphery-or to all three? Most
of his examples are drawn from CDR 11 with its focus on Eastern Europe, yet
he is clearly trying to develop a moral praxis of the revolutionary group that
would be more generally applicable. This, above all, would require working out
a syste~tic critique of capitalism. Morality antI History contains a lengthy
section devoted to an immanent critique of capitalism, showing the impossibility
of Iiving out its own most intimate structures, namely its dominant morality.
But, focussed as that work is on private Iife under capitalism, with its patriarchal
structures, it is a valuable but only incomplete part of the systemic analysis-Iike
the one he projected regarding the USSR-that would have been required to
ground a broadly revolutionary praxis aimed at replacing capitalism. Such an
analysis requires mastery of vast empirical detail on capitalism. Perhaps because
"socialist ethics" hangs in the air for want of such grounding, and despite the
richness added by Morality and History and CDR 11 (which .was itself dropped
only two years earlier in the face of the vast research required to complete it),
Sartre dropped it and never returned to finish it, going on to other projects. The
revolutionary praxis it urges lacks situatedness as a result.
We believe a generous and comprehensive reading of Sartre and bis fellow
existentialists would uncover resources for answering these questions, perhaps
convincingly. But after studying the mid-60's writings on ethics we find
ourselves left with them.
Conclusion
A member of Sartre's Rome audience who was attached to an Eastern
European Communist Party chided Sartre in the discussion, calling on him to gel
elsewhere. A partial inventory of Sartre'. position. on revolutionary violence i. made by Thomal
C. Anderson in his 1he Foundalion and Slruclure 0/ Sartrean Elhicl (Lawrence: Regentl Preis of
Kansas, 1979), Chapter 4, espe pp. 132-136.
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off the fence and either go back to Heidegger or come forward to Marx.52 But
we believe Sartre is neither ambiguous on central issues nor un-Marxist. It is
perhaps because regimes that supported such participants ignored Sartre's
cautions against alienated moralities that the revolution of 1989 was inevitable.
In any case, it seems to us Sartre's Marxism can still help in 1991 in thinking
through revolutionary social change.
Sartre's existential "socialist morality" was bom under the brutal
repressiveness of fascist occupation. Following the liberation, he and his
comrades hoped that, using such a morality, France would move "From
Resistance to Revolution"-the promethean masthead slogan of Albert Camus'
daily newspaper Combat. It may seem that fascist-like defenses of the status quo
no longer exist and hence tbat existential ethics is only an historical curiosity.
But the rape and murder of nuos and priests who work with the poor in Central
America does not significantly differ from the arbitrary murder of French
citizens by Nazi troops, or the lynching of blacks in the U.S. South, which
Simone de Beauvoir found in 1948 to be "an absolute evil. "S3 Such acts have
a single message: obey; if you assert a need, or protest its denial, you will be
treated likewise. The equivalent of fascist occupation surely exists, at least on
the system's periphery where it is currently challenged. The "socialist morality"
is therefore still pertinent. It would in any case be prudent to preserve, publish,
and study these incomplete writings of Sartre's in order to have tools-in-waiting
that can be picked up and completed for new purposes, as they are needed.
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.52personalletter to the authon from Professor Howard Parsons of Bridlepor1 University, who
attended the conference and heard Sar1re talk .
.53The Elhics 0/Ambiguily, p. 146.
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